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In March 2001, Fortune magazine published a critical article about the energy 
giant Enron. The article’s author, Bethany McLean, wrote that the company’s 
business had become so “mind-numbingly complex” that it was almost impossible 
to explain what it did.1 Among other complaints, McLean noted the company’s 
use of “vague, grandiose terms like the ‘financialization of energy’” to describe 
its business activities.2 At the time, Enron was widely regarded as a success story 
in the business press and such a rebuke was rare. However, when the company 
declared bankruptcy that December after revelations of accounting fraud, the 
Fortune piece turned out to be prescient. Books, films, magazine articles, jokes, 
plays, and musicals about this complex business quickly permeated the popular 
cultural landscape, echoing McLean’s point that Enron’s use of language failed 
to explain its complicated business practices. 
It may seem odd that outrage over Enron came in the form of a critique of 
language. However, this criticism highlights how crucial language was to En-
ron’s fortunes. Toward the end of the 1990s, Enron’s managers touted this lack 
of specificity as evidence of the company’s greatness. Enron’s fuzzy language 
communicated more than McLean’s complaint implied. Explaining what the 
company did may have been hard, but Enron had not lacked a consistent mes-
sage during these years. According to Enron’s marketing literature from the late 
1990s, the deregulation of a number of industries in the United States was critical 
to the nation’s prosperity. In criticizing Enron’s use of language, McLean was 
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striking at the ways in which Enron attempted to shape the business climate in 
the Unites States.
Interestingly, Enron’s public identity had not always rested on abstract im-
agery. The vague language and complicated business practices were the result 
of a longer, and stunning, transformation the company had undergone over the 
course of the 1990s. The dramatic nature of Enron’s shift in representation be-
comes clear when considering its former corporate image. Though now largely 
forgotten, environmental responsibility was once the core of Enron’s corporate 
identity. Until 1997, Ken Lay, Enron’s chairman and chief executive officer 
(CEO), explicitly shaped his company’s image and operations to appeal to 
widespread concern about the environment in the United States.
Examining the evolution of Enron’s image-making practices lays bare some 
of neoliberalism’s most troubling qualities. Neoliberalism is the term scholars 
have given to a political-economic philosophy that emerged in the 1970s and 
became dominant during the 1980s and 1990s. Advocates of neoliberalism regard 
free trade and unregulated markets as the sources of numerous social goods, in-
cluding democratic, individual freedom and material abundance.3 The neoliberal 
market is both metaphorical and real. As scholars including David Harvey and 
Gretta Krippner have noted, the rise of neoliberalism has been accompanied 
by the central place that financial services and financial markets have come to 
occupy in the global economy.4 Manfred Steger and Ravi Roy have noted that 
neoliberalism is advanced through policy actions such as deregulation, trade lib-
eralization, and privatization, but corporate managers have long been among the 
philosophy’s most vocal and influential champions, often trumpeting its utopian 
promises.5 Both popular and scholarly critics such as Thomas Frank and historian 
Eric Guthey have called attention to the visually thrilling style corporations ad-
opted during the 1990s and have deconstructed dubious neoliberal claims about 
democracy.6 The evolution of Enron’s marketing efforts dramatized the fate of 
environmental stewardship in an economic system that prioritizes free markets 
and the logic of finance. As public liberal critic Naomi Klein has pointed out, 
some consumer product companies in the 1990s traded on an explicitly envi-
ronmentally friendly image in pursuit of profits.7 In contrast, Enron’s gradual 
abandonment of environmental imagery and ecologically sound energy sources in 
favor of free markets and more abstract forms of commerce, exposing the limits 
of neoliberalism’s ability to support a meaningful environmentalism.
This shift in Enron’s rhetoric and visual imagery and its implications for the 
environment demonstrated the ways in which corporations perform cultural work 
to advance a self-interested political–economic agenda. For scholars in American 
studies, examining this corporate cultural work is crucial for understanding how 
political-economic systems are both established and maintained. In advocating 
for a “cultural turn” in business history, Kenneth Lipartito has stressed the impor-
tance of “the relationship between the firm” and the world around it.8 Lipartito’s 
argument can be useful for American studies. While the field has lately focused 
on neoliberalism as a political–economic regime, relatively little attention has 
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been given to the ways in which a corporation can be a cultural actor. Enron in 
particular is worth considering because it fully demonstrated the cultural and 
political power dynamic embedded in a corporation’s visual and written rhetoric. 
The company’s marketing efforts in the late 1990s constituted a cultural project 
that promoted a neoliberal political-economic vision of a world in which cor-
porations could conduct business without the burden of government regulation. 
Enron’s corporate makeover during this decade was inherently political and not 
without consequence.
Though the outlines of Enron’s history have been recounted elsewhere, it 
is worth briefly examining them here and then considering specific points in 
more detail later in this article. When two US natural gas companies merged 
under a new name, Enron, in 1985, they created the largest gas pipeline system 
in the country. Based in Houston, Texas, the new company, like other natural 
gas businesses, faced the challenge of adapting to the federal government’s slow 
process of unraveling the industry’s regulatory framework that had begun with 
the 1978 Natural Gas Act. Over the course of the next several years, the federal 
government continued to deregulate the industry. Significantly, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 436 in 1985 granted “open access” to 
gas transportation, giving pipeline carriers greater flexibility in moving the fuel 
around the country.9 The next year, FERC began moving toward a market system 
for determining the price of gas. By the mid-1980s, in other words, natural gas 
had become a complicated industry. Acting as a consultant in 1989, Jeff Skilling 
introduced a way for Enron to capitalize on the instability this deregulation had 
ushered in. The Gas Bank, as he called it, was such a success that Skilling joined 
Enron and led the push to replicate this strategy in other areas. By the late 1990s, 
Enron barely resembled the gas pipeline company it had once been. However, 
there was financial rot inside the company. Enron was not nearly as profitable 
as it appeared—a fact obscured by fraudulent accounting techniques. When the 
fraud was exposed in late 2001, the company quickly collapsed into bankruptcy.10
A Focus on the Environment
Long before Enron and its managers became infamous for accounting 
fraud, the company traded heavily on an environmentally friendly image. This 
green identity emerged shortly after Enron’s formation in the mid-1980s. An 
early example of the company’s environmental rhetoric and visual imagery 
can be found in its 1988 annual report. The report’s cover featured a gas power 
plant in the background with a field of flowers in the foreground.11 The image 
embodied a pastoral ideal that sought to harmonize the photograph’s two ele-
ments—the industrial power plant and the fields.12 The plant and field coexisted 
peacefully and without contradiction. In the report’s letter to shareholders, the 
authors (nominally Lay and Enron President and Chief Operating Officer Rich 
Kinder) suggested that “renewed interest in clean air” would be good for the 
natural gas company.13 In tandem with increasing concern over environmental 
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degradation in public discourse, the company’s environmental image emerged 
in full in 1989. That report’s cover proclaimed that natural gas was the “cleanest 
burning and most economical of all fossil fuels” and that it held “the promise 
for a cleaner world.”14
Significantly, this green image owed more to cultural pressures that it did 
to any overarching concern for the environment. The greenhouse effect, acid 
rain, and a general concern over the state of the environment loomed large in 
US culture in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Not only did President George 
H. W. Bush put a good deal of energy into major amendments in 1990 to the 
twenty-year-old Clean Air Act, but the twentieth anniversary of Earth Day that 
April promised to be a major event. Both Time and Newsweek ran long stories 
on that occasion, though the two magazines evoked different attitudes. Time 
optimistically proclaimed that “a quiet revolution is greening the country,” while 
Newsweek pessimistically shed light on environmental degradation up and down 
the Mississippi River.15
The conspicuous coverage of ecological peril in 1990 had been a long time 
coming. Throughout the 1980s, Americans had become increasingly concerned 
that the Reagan Administration was not doing enough to combat such risks. A 
solid majority, around 70%, felt that the environment was at risk and that the 
government was not doing enough to protect the planet and address ecological 
concerns.16 By the start of the next decade, most Americans self-identified as envi-
ronmentalists.17 It was little wonder, then, that a host of corporations deliberately 
cultivated environmentally friendly images.18 Like many corporations in the late 
1980s, Lay and other Enron executives adjusted the company’s corporate iden-
tity and strategy in response to shifting cultural attitudes toward environmental 
stewardship. Part of this process meant building on cultural values, concerns, and 
tropes already in circulation. Within a few years, the environment had assumed 
a central place in Enron’s corporate identity and marketing.
Late in 1990, the same year as the Clean Air Act amendments and the twen-
tieth Earth Day, Lay told an audience in Houston, Texas, that he was “convinced 
that Enron is in the right business at the right time. We firmly believe natural 
gas will be the fuel of the 1990s—and for good reasons. First of all, it’s a clean 
source of energy, contributing less than any other fossil fuel to the emissions, 
which cause acid rain, the greenhouse effect or the destruction of the ozone layer 
in the atmosphere.”19 As his comments suggest, Lay regarded natural gas’s en-
vironmental benefits as critical to Enron’s fortunes. Enron, he declared, wanted 
to become “the first natural gas major, the most innovative and reliable provider 
of clean energy worldwide for a better environment.”20
For the next several years, environmental rhetoric and iconography continued 
to appear regularly in Enron’s marketing literature.21 Illustrations and photographs 
throughout the 1992 annual report, for example, featured all of Enron’s business 
operations and units as in harmony with green, nature-themed backdrops—an 
extension of the same themes the company had been working with for years. 
In 1994, the company even introduced an environmental code of ethics. As the 
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code stated, “Enron Corp. is committed to the protection of the environment. 
Environmental concerns are embodied in the company’s Vision and Values.”22 
After declaring that employees had to comply with environmental regulations, the 
code went further to mandate that “Employees must consider the environmental 
consequences of all aspects of company operations.”23
These were not merely superficial statements meant to produce a friendlier 
corporate image. These larger cultural concerns also shaped Enron’s business 
strategy in the early 1990s.24 For example, in 1989 and 1990, Lay began pro-
moting what he referred to as the “natural gas standard.” Again emphasizing the 
environmental benefits of natural gas relative to other fossil fuels, Lay suggested 
that no other power generation plants be built unless they could at least equal 
gas-fired cogeneration plants in both cost and environmental impact.25 When the 
company began expanding beyond natural gas, it primarily entered into environ-
mentally friendly industries such as wind and solar power.26 When the company 
bought a California wind turbine manufacturer, it also gained control of what 
was then the world’s largest wind energy farm (in Minnesota).27 Likewise, in 
the mid-1990s, the company branched out into solar energy. This seemed like 
enough of a growth area for the company that it even established a renewable 
energy subsidiary toward the end of the decade. Throughout the 1990s, Enron 
never hesitated in strategically deploying green rhetoric when it proved useful. 
For example, in 1997, the company’s annual report cover featured a close-up of 
lush, vibrant green leaves.
This focus on the environment also permeated the corporation’s internal 
messaging. Throughout the first part of the 1990s, writers for Enron Business, a 
publication for employees, touted the company’s commitment to environmental 
responsibility. For instance, the May 1994 issue was dedicated entirely to Enron’s 
environmental efforts. In an echo of earlier annual report covers that evinced a 
pastoral ideal, the May 1994 Enron Business cover linked this ideal to Enron’s 
power plant in Teeside, England, which was the company’s most ambitious 
international development project at that time. The photograph placed cows 
meandering in a field in the foreground with a mammoth industrial structure in 
the background, while the caption read: “Nature and technology harmoniously 
coincide at Enron’s 1,875 megawatt Teeside Power Facility, which is fueled by 
clean-burning natural gas. The facility, located in the United Kingdom, exempli-
fies Enron’s commitment to a better environment worldwide.”28 Much like the 
cover, many of the articles inside sought to reconcile the company’s profit-making 
activities and political leanings with a sense of environmental responsibility.
The environment was a recurring theme both in Enron’s outward market-
ing and branding efforts and in its internal communications, suggesting how 
central environmental stewardship (albeit of a market-friendly variety) was to 
the company’s brand and identity. The environmental focus is indicative of the 
power dynamic Enron (and other corporations) faced in the early 1990s. Enron 
certainly pursued favorable political and regulatory conditions, but as the outward 
emphasis on environmental responsibility revealed, the company was conducting 
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business and designing its image to conform to, rather than shape, public opinion. 
By the end of the decade, there was a dramatic change in this power relation.
Shifting Focus Toward the Intangible
Internal corporate identities are rarely as unified as a company’s public image. 
As much as environmental stewardship may have been central to the company’s 
public, corporate identity, individual units within Enron did not necessarily 
embrace this theme wholeheartedly. Management scholars Stuart Albert and 
David Whetton have argued against the notion that any large organization pos-
sesses one, unified organizational (as opposed to public or corporate) identity.29 
By the late 1990s, Enron’s image had shifted drastically. Much like the green 
rhetoric, the seeds of this transformation in the company’s image also lay in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Even at the beginning of the decade, changes were 
under way within the company that eventually pushed it to celebrate a world 
dominated by the sophisticated manipulation of complicated pieces of informa-
tion. As future Enron CEO and President Jeff Skilling introduced new business 
Figure 1: Photograph used on the cover of Enron Business, May, 1994. Photo 
courtesy of Southwest Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech Uni-
versity, Lubbock, Texas, Enron Business, SWC HD9581.U53 E57.
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strategies and divisions throughout the 1990s, the corporation’s environmental 
image disappeared. By the time the company collapsed in late 2001, the language 
and imagery Enron used to describe itself celebrated the triumph of “brain work” 
and unabashedly promoted a free market economic ideology.
Enron’s fortunes had long been bound up with the regulation of natural gas. 
Though natural gas was heavily regulated for much of the twentieth century, 
beginning in the 1970s, and continuing throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the federal government deregulated the industry.30 The effect was dramatic. 
Rather than the steady, predictable business that it had been, the natural gas 
industry was characterized by “unprecedented volatility.”31 Not only had FERC 
Order 436 changed how gas flowed through US pipelines, but by the mid-1980s, 
gas prices were determined by short-term sales at key points in the country’s 
pipeline system (such as Henry Hub in Texas). Referred to as the spot market, 
this arrangement meant that prices could change frequently.32 Though Lay had 
long been an advocate of deregulation as a guiding economic principle, it was 
not immediately clear how his company could profit from these developments.
However, in 1988 and 1989, Skilling, then a consultant with McKinsey and 
Co., developed the Gas Bank concept that allowed the company to profit from 
deregulation’s volatility and fluctuating prices. The magnitude of Enron’s pipe-
line network gave the company a good deal of flexibility in moving gas around 
the country. Such an advantage allowed Enron to offer a variety of derivative 
contracts that enabled its customers (such as large industrial concerns) to secure 
long-term supplies of the commodity at predictable prices. Through buying and 
selling natural gas, as well as through offering derivatives related to the buying 
and selling of natural gas, the Gas Bank operated more like a financial institution 
than a pipeline company. The strategy was a success, and about a year later, Lay 
and others at Enron convinced Skilling to leave McKinsey and join Enron as 
head of Enron Gas Services.33 This unit housed the Gas Bank and, in time, grew 
so influential that it drove the direction the company took throughout the 1990s.
Earlier in his career, Skilling had not been interested in the energy industry 
and had hoped to focus on banks and other financial institutions. However, with 
an economic crisis in Houston in the 1980s, he saw that practically “every bank 
in the State of Texas was bankrupt. . . . And I kind of realized that, if I was going 
to be in Texas, there were no more financial institutions left here, so I better learn 
the energy business.”34 At Enron, Skilling would be allowed to combine finance 
and energy. In effect, Skilling introduced a style of business and internal culture 
that resembled banking and financial activities far more than it did the operation 
of gas pipelines, cogeneration power plants, exploration, and development.35
The Gas Bank and Enron Gas Services offered different derivative products 
to secure future years’ prices. Generally, derivatives are defined as “tradable 
contracts” whose value is derived from “the value of other assets.”36 Because 
derivatives were developed to hedge and insure against financial risk, such as 
fluctuations in currency exchange rates or a potential rise or fall in the price of 
a specific commodity, some have characterized derivatives as types of money 
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that attempt to “make the future both profitable and secure.”37 For example, one 
type of derivative is a put option—a contract that gives the buyer the right to 
sell something (a stock or a commodity) for a set price at a specific time in the 
future.38 Despite these differences in the types of derivatives, all of them have the 
same basic function of hedging against risk associated with economic activity.
Though such financial products had been around for a long time, Skilling’s 
use of them was unique. The idea of using derivatives was foreign enough to 
the gas industry that the July 1993 issue of Enron Business featured an inset 
explaining basic types of derivative contracts to its employees.39
For Enron, this meant a significant departure from its original business. 
Rather than transporting gas at set prices, Enron Gas Services pointed toward 
a way to profit from the suddenly unstable natural gas business. What is more, 
Enron had done so in a way that resembled “knowledge work” instead of the 
traditional way of operating gas pipelines. Natural gas had suddenly become a 
risky business to be in, and it was Enron’s offering of various immaterial risk 
management products (such as derivatives) that provided a way for the company 
to make money. However, the change in direction presented the company with 
new problems.
Problems of Representation
From the beginning, this financial style of work introduced a unique problem 
of representation. The company’s earlier image of environmental responsibility 
had been relatively easy to represent. The environment and the power business 
came with stock images of pristine wilderness and industrial might. By contrast, 
Skilling and others at Enron found that, at least at first, no language existed that 
could adequately describe what the company did. Ironically, as Enron’s business 
practices moved toward emphasizing information, communicating the nature 
of that information became increasingly difficult. Throughout the middle of the 
1990s, Enron struggled to find the words to describe itself, settling on increas-
ingly vague language imparting feelings and values rather than defining concrete 
products and processes. Likewise, the visual style the company employed from 
this point forward increasingly turned from literal and realist depictions of the 
company’s industrial operations and environmental sensitivity and toward abstract 
shapes and designs. This new rhetorical and graphic style mirrored an emerg-
ing aesthetic associated with the “new economy” of the late 1990s and worked 
in tandem with the company’s new emphasis on immateriality and brain work.
In 1994, Enron again changed its company vision. The company was, it 
declared, “The world’s first natural gas major . . . creating energy solutions 
worldwide.”40 Although the 1994 annual report still mentioned the environmental 
benefits of natural gas, the issue was beginning to take a backseat to far more 
abstract ideas and values, as evidenced by its use of words like “creative,” “energy 
solutions,” and “innovative.”
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That same year, Enron Gas Services changed its name to Enron Capital and 
Trade. When it was covered in Enron Business, the new name was treated as a 
momentous event.41 As the article noted, the team involved in devising the new 
name took its charge seriously. The author wrote that the team “evaluated the 
marketplace. They consulted dictionaries and thesauruses [sic].”42 Significantly, 
the word gas was removed from the title. The material commodity that Enron 
had been dealing in since its inception was removed altogether. Yet in doing so, 
the business unit faced the challenge of explaining what it did. The problem of 
communicating the changing nature of the business was apparently significant 
enough that the writer of the Enron Business piece went so far as to dissect the 
new name. According to the article, “Enron” communicated “the notion of en-
ergy,” capital represented finance, and trade represented the physical side of the 
business.43 Still, even though the last word in the title was meant to signify the 
physical, material aspects of the business, the description had more to do with 
derivatives and risk management services than with physical delivery of natural 
gas. The new name, as imprecise as it was, served as an important marker for 
the direction the company was moving in. In 1995, Enron’s marketing literature 
declared that the company had established itself as an “entrepreneurial, innova-
tive, and vision-driven company.”44 While such words could be used to describe 
the feel of a company, unlike earlier descriptions, these words and phrases failed 
to convey the precise nature of the company’s operations.
Paradoxically, as Enron moved more toward an emphasis on knowledge 
work, the language became far less concrete. The problem of language in describ-
ing what Enron did was not lost on the company’s senior managers. During his 
2006 criminal trial, Skilling reflected on this problem of language.45 As he put it, 
“we tried over the years—it was hard because this was new—to describe what it 
was. And we tried lots of different words over the decade.”46 While at first Enron’s 
identity had been linked directly to gas and electricity, Skilling admitted to wor-
rying about being too closely tied to the material, because the company’s stock 
would be more likely to rise and fall with the price of gas (something Skilling 
felt was unfair because the company was providing services related to gas). In 
Skilling’s telling, Enron later became known as a “merchant” company, though 
the executive felt that the word did not “sound quite right.”47 He preferred the 
term intermediation, though “everybody told me that it’s just too hard for people 
to understand, just, you know, sounds kind of technical. We tried logistics.”48 
Yet even logistics did not adequately describe Enron, and Skilling continued to 
struggle to define the company. As he put it, for more than ten years, his busi-
ness unit was described as “a sophisticated deliverer of product and services to 
customers.”49 Tellingly, the phrase Skilling ultimately settled on was tortured 
and coincided with a general lack of specificity in describing what Enron did. 
As Skilling put it, representing Enron’s evolving business “was an ongoing is-
sue that went way back in time, and it was—it was difficult because this is not 
a simple concept to get across.”50 If communicating this new approach to the 
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natural gas industry was a problem, though, the business practices and strategies 
the company should adopt were increasingly clear to Skilling.
In many ways, 1997 was a watershed year for Enron. A new logo, featuring 
a tilted uppercase E, was only the most visible change.51 That year, the company 
reached a milestone. As Skilling put it during his trial testimony, around this time 
Enron reached a tipping point where Enron Capital and Trade—the business 
Skilling had started—became the company’s most profitable unit.52 As Skilling 
put it then, Enron decided to focus on developing what he termed “brain-intensive 
businesses” as opposed to “capital-intensive projects.”53 Not coincidentally, many 
people agree that this was also the year the company crossed a line into outright 
fraud. When the company collapsed in late 2001, a number of complicated de-
rivative agreements that failed to adequately protect Enron from economic risk 
were at the root of the problem. Still, in 1997, this financial logic was dictating 
much of the company’s operations.
Much like the Gas Bank, newer strategies usually involved introducing 
some sort of derivative product. Most infamously, Enron was one of the first 
companies to offer a weather derivative (again, in 1997), which promised to 
hedge against adverse weather conditions—perhaps one of the most audacious 
attempts to avert the risks inherent in the physical world.54 The idea of weather 
derivatives offered the most striking rejoinder to the company’s previous image 
and focus on environmental stewardship. Earlier in the decade, Enron’s ecologi-
cal rhetorical and graphic style had expressed an interdependent relationship to 
the world in which it was embedded; now, through knowledge work, the natural 
world could be transcended.
Weather derivatives were, however, only the most obvious and extreme 
examples of the company’s attempts to supersede the material world with its 
brain-intensive businesses. Much like Enron Capital and Trade’s early success 
in offering stability in the suddenly chaotic natural gas industry, Enron sought 
to introduce similar services across different industries. Famously, since the 
mid-1990s, Enron’s managers had been advocating for states to open up their 
electricity markets to competition, leading to a protracted energy crisis in Cali-
fornia at the turn of the twenty-first century. Ironically, the company even began 
to market credit risk and bankruptcy derivatives. Other schemes included trading 
commodities, such as paper and pulp, and Internet bandwidth.55 In all of these 
instances, Enron was attempting to both profit from and remove various risks 
associated with the physical, material world by subjecting that world to the logic 
of modern finance. The move was so striking that in 2000 and 2001 Skilling 
described Enron as an e-commerce company.56 By favoring brain-intensive busi-
nesses, Skilling and Enron were privileging the immaterial world of ideas, but the 
phrase implied more than a particular corporate strategy. Much in the same way 
the Gas Bank had been based on the application of financial derivatives to the 
natural gas business, the idea of brain-intensive businesses revealed the extent to 
which Skilling had drawn on investment banking in his effort to remake Enron.
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In her study of New York investment banking culture in the 1990s and 2000s, 
anthropologist Karen Ho identified a “culture of smartness” on Wall Street.57 
Investment bankers regard having “smart” employees as critical for managing 
upheaval and change.58 However, such a conceit is not mere vanity. Ho argues 
that investment bankers regard their own smartness as a license to create that 
change and upheaval. She writes that in the Wall Street culture of smartness, 
other businesses and industries are regarded as lacking smartness and “thus less 
likely to survive the demands of global capitalism unless they restructure their 
cultural values and practices according to the standards of Wall Street.”59
A similar attitude had taken hold at Enron. Skilling had so thoroughly 
transformed Enron’s culture and practices that the company actively competed 
with investment banks for the same recruits.60 Much in the way Ho identified 
smartness as a key value among investment bankers, Skilling’s brain-intensive 
businesses indicated a similar value system. The executive explicitly prioritized 
a Wall Street–style smartness above anything else in the company’s business.61 
Yet Enron continued to face the problem of communicating the idea of its brain-
intensive businesses. What is more, much like the investment banking culture of 
smartness implied the need for other industries to accept Wall Street demands, 
Enron’s new business model both implied and relied on a specific economic ideol-
ogy that emphasized an unregulated financial landscape. Enron’s new corporate 
strategy mirrored neoliberalism’s overall shift toward finance.62
The stakes were high. Lay had spent years cultivating a corporate image 
based on clean energy largely because of cultural pressures. Now, as Skilling’s 
power grew, Enron was abandoning commitments to an obvious public good such 
as the environment for a new set of intangible business practices based upon be-
ing smart. This new strategy had far-reaching political-economic consequences.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the company’s managers sought to create new 
opportunities for profit by actively championing neoliberal policy ideas such 
as deregulation and privatization in industries beyond natural gas, including 
electricity. The company’s aggressive efforts at deregulation state by state were 
chronicled extensively in the pages of Enron Business. Though in a 1999 article 
Steve Kean, an Enron executive, declared his Government Affairs unit members 
to be “activists who drive change,” it would be a long fight for Enron Energy 
Services, the company’s electricity services department (which was headed by 
Lou Pai—later an infamous character in published Enron narratives).63 Even two 
years later, Enron Business was declaring that although Enron Energy Services 
had “a national franchise in place,” it still had to “battl[e] state legislatures to 
open their markets to competition” so that the business unit could create “inno-
vative products and services” for the “North American marketplace.”64 Articles 
about the status and pace of electric utility “restructuring” (a term the company 
sometimes used) routinely featured maps revealing which states were moving 
toward deregulation and even what level of deregulation that state was adopting.
What is more, the company did not hesitate to get involved in attempts to 
secure favorable legislation or regulatory action. For instance, in February 1995, 
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Lay wrote to then–Texas Governor George W. Bush that “restricting important 
competitors from the wholesale power market harms the Texas economy by 
causing higher electric prices, less investment, and fewer jobs.”65 This was one 
of many letters Lay sent to his friend in Austin, warning him of the dangers the 
state faced if it did not deregulate the wholesale electricity industry. However, 
positioning deregulation as a measure that had to be adopted to meet the threat 
of looming competition from other states and the flight of capital was not a 
good replacement for environmental responsibility in terms of a public image. 
The gloomy warning Lay sent to Bush was hardly suitable as a brand message.
In addition to seeking national deregulation, the company faced the chal-
lenge of legitimizing its position in the way it represented itself. Environmental 
responsibility had been an uncontroversial corporate image, but as the 1990s 
wore on, Enron engaged in the more difficult cultural project of both creating 
and celebrating a newly unstable, risky world.
Celebrating Instability
The change was almost immediately recognizable in the 1997 annual report. 
Throughout Enron’s career, the annual reports had been relatively sober (though 
always optimistic) statements about the company’s performance and prospects. 
That year, in an introductory section titled “Who we are,” the company declared, 
“We begin with a fundamental belief in the inherent wisdom of open markets. 
We are innovative. We are all about creating energy. We operate safely and with 
a concern for the environment.”66 In many ways, this statement was as a good 
indication of the direction Enron was taking. While the environmental rhetoric 
was still there (and featured on the cover), it had taken a backseat to a political-
economic investment in “open markets.” The following statement, that Enron was 
innovative, deliberately highlighted a word that the company had always used 
but that began to form the core of the company’s identity. Significantly, it was a 
description but not concrete. Still, the term implied a style of business and car-
ried far more philosophical weight than perhaps the company realized. The next 
statement, in which Enron declared that it was “all about creating energy,” was 
far less specific than such earlier self-characterizations as a “vertically integrated 
clean energy company.” Enron’s language problems were still present, but the 
company, it seemed, had found a solution. Forgoing concrete descriptions of its 
business, the company’s new marketing literature emphasized a set of cultural, 
political, and economic values instead.
This shift in the company’s rhetorical and representational modes coincided 
with a larger movement in US business. The late 1990s witnessed a boom in in-
formation technologies, leading to what many dubbed the “new economy.” Nigel 
Thrift has pointed out that the new economy was in many ways a cultural project 
that “began to refigure (or, in the jargon, reframe) the business organization’s 
relationship with the world.”67 The new economy was articulated through what 
Thrift has referred to as the “cultural circuit” of capitalism, including manage-
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ment consultants, business schools, and magazines such as Fast Company and 
Business 2.0. The rhetoric of this new economy was primarily based on metaphors 
that evoked “constant adaptive movement—‘dancing’, ‘surfing’, and the like” 
and new forms of business organization that were faster and more adaptable in a 
“world which is now figured as complex and ambiguous.”68 Provocatively sug-
gesting that these metaphors “constitute the international business community’s 
‘linguistic turn,’” Thrift has argued that business organizations became “cultural 
entities,” which attempted to “generate new traditions, new representations” of 
themselves “and the world.”69
For Thrift, this new managerial culture was hegemonic inside of corporations, 
creating more precarious forms of employment. However, these same metaphors 
and tropes could be used by a corporation to represent itself to the world and to 
advance the sort of political-economic system Enron had begun to rely on for 
new business ventures and to advocate for at the policy level.70 For years, Enron 
had struggled to find some adequate way of representing itself to the world. With 
the arrival of the new economy, the company was supplied with a ready stock 
of tropes, images, and metaphors that it could use in describing its businesses.
The new economy’s emphasis on immaterial labor meshed well with Skill-
ing’s insistence that the company would focus on brain-intensive businesses. In 
addition, the new economy’s preoccupation with adapting to chaos and instability 
recalled natural gas deregulation and the Gas Bank’s success earlier in the decade. 
In an echo of the new economy’s emphasis on navigating economic turbulence, 
some of Enron’s long-term goals, such as the push for electricity deregulation in 
the United States and even water privatization in the developing world, could be 
seen as attempts to profit from instability and even to create unstable markets. In 
short, ideologically, Enron was at home in the new economy, and the company 
increasingly engaged in a cultural project—celebrating many core values of the 
new economy, and the young, energetic knowledge worker as a cultural ideal.71
This shift was also noticeable in the change in the visual imagery the com-
pany used in its marketing material. For instance, the covers of the company’s 
last three annual reports (1998–2000) reflected the new style. Images of young 
brain workers on the phone or standing in front of computers replaced those of 
power plants or pipelines comfortably nestled among rolling green fields and 
pastures. Depictions of such tangible objects were relegated with increasing 
regularity to smaller plots of real estate on the page. The interiors of the 1998 
report were equally striking. For example, one photograph depicted Lay and 
Skilling standing in the middle of a room (probably a trading floor) with young 
employees at work in front of computers. It was also in this annual report that 
the company began using a key new economy concept—network—to describe 
itself. The term was also featured prominently in the following year’s report.
The 1999 cover featured four people in a blank space, standing inside a box 
with smooth white edges. The rest of the page featured several arcing, elliptical 
lines. This visual motif, meant to symbolize the company’s networks connecting 
material assets and knowledge workers across space and time, was persistent 
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throughout the report. Similarly, the 2000 report’s cover also featured boxes 
with rounded edges. However, rather than a single box framing a specific image, 
each group of boxes had the effect of breaking up an image (usually a person), 
making it appear that the body had been spread across several computer screens. 
This new visual style was a far cry from the trope of environmental stewardship 
that punctuated the company’s print presence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The predominant visual imagery in Enron’s marketing efforts was now entirely 
metaphorical or abstract and nonrepresentational.
This change was not simply one of aesthetic preference. On some level, 
Enron’s changing business necessitated a change in its visual style. While previ-
ously the company had the ability to photograph one of its many power plants 
or pipelines, as Lay had first noted in 1998, the company faced the problem of 
depicting “the invisibility of both methane and electrons.”72 Yet resorting to 
nonrepresentational design was hardly innocent. Such a visual style suggested 
speed and dynamism—the sort of qualities that some proponents of the new 
economy reasoned could only be accommodated by a deregulated marketplace.
The change was equally dramatic in the company’s rhetoric. In linguistic 
echoes of the new graphic design, the 1999 and 2000 annual reports repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of networks, innovation, and creativity. These terms 
were all direct parallels of the stock metaphors and rhetorical flourishes that 
Thrift has identified throughout the cultural circuit of the new economy. As he 
has argued, these metaphors were responses to “a more turbulent and uncertain 
and insecure world.”73 Taken together, they were “based on the notion of constant 
adaptive movement.”74 Drawing on this new rhetoric, Enron’s marketing literature 
celebrated the recent emergence of an unstable world. Instead of highlighting 
clean energy production as it had in the past, the company was emphasizing 
values such as innovation and creativity.
In a sharp contrast to the optimistic, but measured, tone in earlier annual 
reports, the 1999 letter to shareholders was declarative and confrontational. After 
a few vague paragraphs about the nature of networks, the document launched 
into wild declarations about a new economy, proclaiming that “the rules have 
changed dramatically. What you own is not as important as what you know. 
Hard-wired businesses, such as energy and communications, have turned into 
knowledge-based industries that place a premium on creativity.”75 Many of the 
rhetorical motifs of the new economy were present, especially the idea of constant 
movement. Interestingly, that movement caused this language to fail. Notably, 
the letter did not describe in definite terms the company’s business operations. 
Enron, it seemed, was beyond meaning.
Ironically, this shift exacerbated some of the problems of language and 
representation that had dogged the company since the creation of the Gas Bank. 
However, instead of worrying about the vagueness of language, the company 
found a unique solution: celebrating the inadequacy of language in describing 
what the company had become. As the letter to shareholders declared, “Enron is 
moving so fast that sometimes others have trouble defining us. But we know who 
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we are. We are clearly a knowledge-based company.”76 Rather than regarding 
this “trouble” as an embarrassment, the document’s authors seemed to disdain 
any confused readers. The assertion “we know who we are” was aggressive. 
Yet simultaneously, the passage was shot through with traces of handwringing 
and ambiguity. The statement “We are clearly a knowledge-based company” 
was surely meant to convey the same contempt for misunderstanding readers. 
Yet “clearly” could also be read as false bravado. Perhaps the company wasn’t 
so sure what it was. At any rate, the passage did not assign much importance to 
specifying the company’s operations.
This same sense of flux and fluidity was clear in Enron’s self-definition in 
2001. No longer a “vertically integrated clean energy company,” as it saw itself in 
the early 1990s, the company was now an assemblage of “flexible networks” that 
could “deliver physical products at predictable prices.”77 “With our networks,” 
the company’s promotional literature declared, “we can significantly expand our 
existing businesses while extending our services to new markets with enormous 
potential for growth.”78 In the last year of the company’s existence, Enron’s letter 
to shareholders reflected on the ways in which it had changed, stating, “We have 
metamorphosed from an asset-based pipeline and power generating company to 
a marketing and logistics company whose biggest assets are its well-established 
business approach and its innovative people.”79 Strikingly, the company’s let-
ter emphasized an “approach” to business and an ideal type of employee—the 
young knowledge worker.
The company even renamed the pipeline division as Enron Transportation 
Services to reflect “a cultural shift to add more innovative customer services 
to our efficient pipeline approach.”80 The linguistic substitutions emphasized 
nebulous ideals (innovative customer services) over specific material processes. 
Significantly, the company described the change as a cultural shift. While this 
phrase referred to the organization’s internal culture, it could easily have applied 
to the ways in which Enron was presenting itself to the outside world. While 
such name changes might seem to have little import, they indicated substantial 
ideological shifts within the company. As an Enron Business article put it, Enron 
Transportation Services wanted “to be driven by customer needs and market 
demands, rather than the dictates of energy regulators.”81 Yet the name was, ac-
cording to that business unit’s CEO, also meant to indicate a “renewed emphasis 
on being responsive to customer needs by moving faster, offering new products 
and services and becoming more competitive.”82 These statements revealed a 
free market ideology behind the move away from specific language and the 
celebration of fast change and movement.
Asking Why
If there was any space between the new visual and rhetorical style and the 
push for deregulation and open markets as guiding economic principles, a new 
television advertising campaign in 2000 significantly closed the gap. In a 2000 
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article in Enron Business about the new campaign, the author opened with the 
problem of representation. As the author put it, “How do you describe a company 
like Enron?”83 To get an answer, the company’s ad agency interviewed “Enron’s 
leading thinkers” about the company.84 Such references to leading thinkers and 
the like reflected the company’s move toward operating in brain-intensive busi-
nesses and intellectual capital. The implication behind such phrases again pointed 
to the company’s emphasis on intellect instead of industry. Increasingly, Enron 
sought to align specific political-economic ideals, such as deregulation, with a 
sense of smartness. This theme had the effect of adding a sense of intellectual 
superiority to the company’s new public neoliberal ideology. Smart people, the 
television spots implied, supported deregulation. This attempt at fusing the two 
ideas was evident throughout the article discussing the advertising campaign.
The campaign’s title and motif even reflected this shift. Titled “Ask Why,” 
the message of the campaign was meant to be “as different and challenging as 
Enron itself.”85 The commercials were often bizarre, perhaps a by-product of the 
problems of visually representing brain-intensive work. In one commercial, a 
figure in a metal business suit wandered different parts of the world. The man, 
obviously encumbered by the suit (vaguely recalling the Tin Man in The Wizard 
of Oz), slowly moved through a series of spaces, such as busy street corners in 
cities like New York. The quick, frenetic movement around him offered a strik-
ing contrast to his slow, awkward gait. The point here was unmistakable. The 
metal suit was a not-so-subtle reference to older industrial businesses—the type 
of company that Skilling (now firmly in charge at Enron) shunned. It was too 
big and clumsy to navigate such a dizzying landscape. Periodically, an audible 
phrase would break away from a din of background chatter. As one voice (before 
cutting over to a close-up of an older man with a serious visage) intoned: “We 
inherit some ideas that are unnecessary. We have to jettison that excess baggage 
in order to make progress.”86 After a few more seconds another voice declared, 
“People who have really creative ideas are people who keep asking ‘why?’” as 
the man in the cumbersome metal suit lumbered through other global, fast-paced 
environments.87 Such backdrops evoked the “complex and ambiguous” world 
that Thrift has viewed as central to the new management ideology.88
In some ways, the advertisement presented an unhappy situation—a cum-
bersome being unsteadily clomping through a confusing world. However, the 
television spot offered a solution. The final shot was a black screen with the 
words “ask why?” below the Enron logo. The Enron Business article explained 
to employees that the “the man in metal serves as a metaphor for the conven-
tional constraints that block change.”89 Typical of the way Enron was using 
language, the statement revealed little. However, the lack of specificity in the 
advertisement made it possible to regard regulatory measures as some of those 
obstacles. Even though there were not specific references to the sort of regula-
tory rollback measures the company pushed for with state governments, phrases 
such as “conventional constraints” and “excess baggage” could easily be read 
as the sorts of regulations the company sought to remove. While the man in the 
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metal suit was also mocking older industrial corporations, the advertisement had 
a clear neoliberal sensibility. Unshackling the corporation, it appeared, was the 
best way to navigate this frightening world.
Another commercial that specifically promoted EnronOnline featured a 
mishmash of realist representations (various traders yelling “buy” and “sell” 
into phones) with metaphorical images such as three men in business suits 
wearing mouse-head masks moving slowly with seeing-eye dogs and tapping 
sticks. In another scene in the commercial, a room full of knowledge workers at 
computer desks all stood up on them, somewhat defiantly (even if the message 
was unclear). Skilling’s voice could be heard over the entire commercial extol-
ling the virtue of EnronOnline as a “transparent, open market.” This commercial 
also ended with the “ask why?” screen.90 Whereas earlier commercials had only 
hinted at regulation as an answer to the question, in this spot the commitment to 
neoliberalism—here an open market—was made explicit.
Perhaps the most direct commercial from the campaign was about the word 
why, which the voiceover proclaimed, “was the voice of the nonconformist.”91 
Throughout, the television spot, titled “Ode to Why,” cut among a series of ex-
citing, somewhat unrelated images, such as a space shuttle taking off, a statue 
of Gandhi, a photograph of Abraham Lincoln, a civil rights march, clips from 
other Enron commercials, and close-ups of various people (including some 
children). The final image before the black “ask why?” screen was the Frank 
Gehry–designed Ginger and Fred building in Prague.
In these commercials, Enron collapsed various strains together to come up 
with an exciting (if confusing) representation of specific ideological values. Enron 
was highlighting its intellectual pretensions, aligning itself with nonconformity 
and a vague notion of radicalism. Throughout the campaign, declarations that 
older ideas sometimes had to be jettisoned positioned the company as forward 
thinking. As the Enron Business article explained, the commercials were meant 
to “communicate the spirit of Enron, the drive that distinguishes it from every 
other energy company, indeed almost any other company in existence.”92 Much 
like the visual and rhetorical style found in Enron’s annual reports of the late 
1990s, these commercials were a part of what Guthey has called “New Economy 
Romanticism,” which echoes “the very familiar narrative of American exception-
alism” and “celebrates the notion that radically atomistic individuals can achieve 
a clean break from the shackles of the past and from oppressive institutions in 
order to create a New World.”93 This sensibility left no space for the relationship 
to the natural world that had once informed both Enron’s corporate brand and 
its official internal culture.
Significantly, the commercials did not primarily emphasize specific services 
(though some, including the one for EnronOnline and another for weather deriva-
tives, did) but rather implied a set of ideas and values. Much like the problems 
that the company had faced since the introduction of the Gas Bank, it was difficult 
to communicate, name, or otherwise represent what Enron did. The Enron Busi-
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ness article did not attempt to solve the problem but instead emphasized values 
such as innovation and creativity. When the article’s author discussed what set 
Enron apart from every other company, it was not some specific service or even 
expertise but “Enron’s restless dissatisfaction with the status quo and its ability 
to quickly grasp how most things can always be improved.”94 The article also 
noted that, in screening the campaign for executives, the commercials appealed 
to them “intellectually.” The statement was another nod to the company’s com-
mitment to brain-intensive work.95
Ultimately, Enron executives hoped that the phrase “ask why” would 
“become the rallying cry of a new generation of business.”96 The statement 
indicated that Enron’s rhetoric and visual imagery was intended to promote a 
political-economic ideology rather than any specific product or service. In addi-
tion to reaching potential customers and serving as a battle cry for business, Lay 
and other top managers hoped the advertising campaign would “also reach the 
elected and appointed officials who set policy and regulations affecting Enron 
Figure 2: Still from Enron television commercial, 2000. Photo courtesy of 
Southwest Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University, Lub-
bock, Texas, Enron Business, SWC HD9581.U53 E57.
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businesses worldwide.”97 The advertising campaign, much like the company’s 
adoption of a new economy style, was inherently political.
The values expressed in these moments were not far from the ideas the 
company had touted for years. In the vision that Enron was offering, the ideas 
of nonconformity and intellectualism—of asking why—were ideologically con-
nected to ideas of entrepreneurialism and creative destruction. Innovative was 
a word the company had used for years to describe itself, its employees, and 
its businesses, but now it truly celebrated the idea. Tellingly, Fortune magazine 
repeatedly listed Enron as the most innovative company in the United States in 
the later part of the 1990s.
By 2000, Enron had in part succeeded in making itself a recognizable 
name with a specific image. The company, when it did appear in media cover-
age, was closely associated not with the power business (for most journalists, 
the company’s origins were only remarkable for the distance the company had 
traveled over the course of fifteen years) but with a turbulent, exciting world of 
new technologies. An illustration of this can be found in the January 24, 2000, 
issue of Fortune. The editors ran a story titled “Enron Takes Its Pipeline to the 
Net.”98 Significantly, the magazine placed the article in the e-company section. 
While the immediate occasion for the story was the company’s (ultimately un-
successful) foray into Internet bandwidth trading, the article called attention to 
the “most innovative” designation that the company had held for years. In an 
issue where many of the advertisements were firmly in what might be termed the 
new economy style, a story about a pipeline company moving into increasingly 
immaterial and ethereal businesses fit right in. The writer, David Kirkpatrick, 
called attention to some “entrepreneurial” people inside the company, as well as 
to Enron’s stock performance. Fortune repeated these themes in other articles 
the magazine ran throughout the year. These sentiments were echoed in other 
business magazines, such as BusinessWeek, as well as widely read publications 
like Time and Newsweek.
The company’s “ask why” slogan suggested a new world in which brains 
and clever thinking could supersede the constraints of the old natural, material 
world. There were casualties in this formulation. The company’s longstanding 
(if self-serving) commitment to environmental stewardship was largely forgot-
ten. What is more, the company relished the disruptive creative destruction that 
was implied by an entrepreneurial ethos and a commitment to innovation. When 
the company declared bankruptcy in December 2001, after a devastating series 
of Wall Street Journal stories revealed massive accounting fraud, many of its 
innovations seemed like outright scams.
In retrospect, perhaps the corporation’s calamitous demise should not have 
been surprising. The subtext to most of Enron’s cultural production was that 
innovation was only possible if a corporation was given free reign. When the 
company’s television commercials implored viewers to “ask why,” they also 
implied that deregulation and open markets (which Enron’s marketing literature 
had championed for years) were the answers to the question.
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It is worth paying close attention to the ways in which businesses are pro-
ducers of culture and media. The cultural turn that Enron took was not merely a 
cosmetic change. The rhetorical and visual aesthetic that the company assumed 
in the latter part of the 1990s simultaneously masked and advanced a neoliberal 
faith in financialization and unregulated markets. At the same time, the shift in 
rhetoric signaled a move away from an earlier environmental commitment that 
had once pervaded the company’s marketing efforts and internal messaging. 
Through its rhetoric, marketing, and visual imagery, Enron became a cultural 
celebrant of a world that was wild and unsettled. In Enron’s telling, this unsteady 
and unregulated marketplace became a desirable space where the creativity and 
intellect of the American business class would lead the way to a prosperous future.
Yet the specific measures that an actor like Enron could take to secure and 
sustain this prosperous future were notably absent in the company’s refurbished 
image. In the process of “financializing energy” (to paraphrase the term that 
irked the Fortune journalist McLean), the company’s original push for ecologi-
cally sound sources of energy disappeared. By the end of the twentieth century, 
the company had entered industries that were at odds with the company’s older 
environmental image, such as “forest products,” and even trading coal.99 In a 
neoliberal economic regime that deemphasized physical, material processes, any 
real consideration of environmental sustainability was out of place.
Still, the power dynamics at work in Enron’s transformation offer a glimmer 
of hope. In his famous analysis of hegemony, Antonio Gramsci revealed how a 
hegemonic group relies on a broader public consent to establish and maintain both 
power and legitimacy. As a contemporary hegemonic ideology, neoliberalism also 
relies on such consent.100 Enron’s case reveals that corporations rely on cultural 
work to sustain their preferred political-economic systems. Without question, a 
large corporation, such as Enron once was, wields enormous power. However, 
a corporation, like any other player in an actor network, is embedded in a web 
of intersecting forms of power—including cultural power—that constrain and 
direct its actions. It is through words and images that corporations such as Enron 
seek neoliberalism’s cultural legitimacy. By turning a critical eye to the tropes 
businesses employ to perform this cultural work, we can begin to decipher and 
challenge their often dubious propositions.
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